Persistent
and Embarrassing Questions
last updated: 2010
HLA
Hart started his book The Concept of Law (1961)
with an outline of 'persistent' questions in jurisprudential
literature. Ronald Dworkin did the same thing in his influential
article 'The Model of Rules I' (1967) - only that his questions were
(at least on their face) different ones, and he dubbed them
'embarrassing'.
Hart
and Dworkin set themselves the task of answering such questions. But
did they? This is a major question that persists in analytical
Jurisprudence, and embarrasses both supporters and opponents of Dworkin
and Hart. However, this section is not devoted to
this persistent and embarrassing question.
Rather,
this section is devoted to another set of questions that persist for
me (because I have not yet found the answer) and that
embarass
me (because I probably should have been able to find the
answer). I am hopeful that anyone who has the answers will illuminate
me as new questions arise.
Why
does 'legal philosophy'
mean the same as 'philosophy
of law' (compare: active philosophy v philosophy of action; scientific
philosophy v philosophy of science; religious philosophy v philosophy
of religion; perceptive philosophy v philosophy of perception...)?
What exactly is the
'semantic
sting'? And what exactly
is the illness that it causes?
Why
have Finnis' contributions to legal theory been so
widely ignored? Why do many of those who ignore them come up with
virtually equivalent theses (but don't acknowledge this)?
Is
the fondness for distracting labels distinctive of
(analytical) Jurisprudence?
How
many conceptions of the rule of law can there be
before the expression becomes meaningless?
Is there an
authoritative version of Raz's theory of
authority?
Aren't
there strong parallels between hermeneutic
legal philosophy (as developed in continental Europe, eg by the
genius François Ost) and Hart's
project -- and the classical tradition of legal theory? (Prof.
Orrego's Oxford seminar is teaching me a lot about this.)
Just
to what extent are undergraduates misguided when they say (as they
overwhelmingly do) that a focus on the internal
viewpoint is a focus on the reasons
why people (in fact) follow the law?
(See my current research topics
for further questions that interest me.)
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