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Persistent
and Embarrassing Questions
last updated: 2010
HLA Hart started his book The Concept of Law (1961) with an outline of 'persistent' questions in jurisprudential literature. Ronald Dworkin did the same thing in his influential article 'The Model of Rules I' (1967) - only that his questions were (at least on their face) different ones, and he dubbed them 'embarrassing'. Hart and Dworkin set themselves the task of answering such questions. But did they? This is a major question that persists in analytical Jurisprudence, and embarrasses both supporters and opponents of Dworkin and Hart. However, this section is not devoted to this persistent and embarrassing question. Rather, this section is devoted to another set of questions that persist for me (because I have not yet found the answer) and that embarass me (because I probably should have been able to find the answer). I am hopeful that anyone who has the answers will illuminate me as new questions arise. Why does 'legal philosophy' mean the same as 'philosophy of law' (compare: active philosophy v philosophy of action; scientific philosophy v philosophy of science; religious philosophy v philosophy of religion; perceptive philosophy v philosophy of perception...)? What exactly is the 'semantic sting'? And what exactly is the illness that it causes? Why
have Finnis' contributions to legal theory been so
widely ignored? Why do many of those who ignore them come up with
virtually equivalent theses (but don't acknowledge this)? Is the fondness for distracting labels distinctive of (analytical) Jurisprudence? How many conceptions of the rule of law can there be before the expression becomes meaningless? Is there an authoritative version of Raz's theory of authority? Aren't there strong parallels between hermeneutic legal philosophy (as developed in continental Europe, eg by the genius François Ost) and Hart's project -- and the classical tradition of legal theory? (Prof. Orrego's Oxford seminar is teaching me a lot about this.) Just to what extent are undergraduates misguided when they say (as they overwhelmingly do) that a focus on the internal viewpoint is a focus on the reasons why people (in fact) follow the law?
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